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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                
NO. 05-1907
________________
BARRY E. SHELLEY,
               Appellant
       v.
TPR. TERRY A. WILSON;
TPR. JEFFERY BROCK
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-00002J)
District Judge: Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr.
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 10, 2005
BEFORE: VAN ANTWERPEN, GREENBERG and NYGAARD, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed :  October 14, 2005)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Barry Shelley filed suit pro se and in forma pauperis against two Pennsylvania
State Police troopers, Terry A. Wilson and Jeffrey Brock, to bring claims for false arrest
2and malicious prosecution.  He claimed that he was charged with stalking, harassment,
and making terroristic threats after Wilson and Brock falsely arrested him on January 6,
2002 and January 12, 2002.  He contended that Wilson and Brock made false statements
in their affidavits of probable cause and later presented false testimony at his trial. 
Shelley was convicted on the stalking and harassment charges (and is currently serving
his sentence at S.C.I. Houtzdale).  The District Court, adopting the Report and
Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, dismissed Shelley’s complaint, with prejudice,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  Shelley appeals and moves for appointment of
counsel.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm in part and vacate in part.  
As the District Court held, Shelley cannot state a claim for damages under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against a police officer for allegedly giving perjured testimony at his
criminal trial.  See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 326 (1983).  
Also, Shelley’s malicious prosecution claim implied the invalidity of his
conviction for stalking and harassment.  Therefore, he does not have a cognizable claim
for damages for malicious prosecution for those crimes until “his conviction or sentence
has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a
state tribunal ..., or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus.”  Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). 
Shelley did not otherwise state a claim for malicious prosecution, even though
success on another aspect of that claim would not necessarily put the validity of his
     The Report & Recommendation erroneously refers to charges of resisting arrest.    1
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conviction in question.  Shelley claimed that he was maliciously prosecuted for making
terroristic threats,  crimes for which he may not have been found guilty (if his allegations1
are construed broadly).  To succeed on this malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, he must show that (1) Wilson and Brock initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the
criminal proceeding ended in his favor; (3) the proceeding was instituted without
probable cause; (4) Wilson and Brock acted maliciously or for a purpose other than
bringing him to justice; and (5) he suffered a deprivation of liberty consistent with the
concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.  See Estate of Smith v.
Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003).  Shelley alleged at least the first four listed
elements of a malicious prosecution claim, if the inference that the criminal proceedings
on the terroristic threat charges ended favorably is considered in conjunction with the
allegations that Wilson and Brock acted maliciously to institute the criminal proceedings
without probable cause.  However, Shelley did not sufficiently allege a deprivation of
liberty.  Shelley stated that he had to attend a two-day trial on the charges of making
terroristic threats, stalking, and harassment, but attendance at trial is not a seizure under
the Fourth Amendment.  See DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 603 (3d
Cir. 2005).  See also Torres v. McLauglin, 163 F.3d 169, 174 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that
the limits of Fourth Amendment protection relate to the boundary between arrest and pre-
trial detention).  Furthermore, he was in court for his trial on other charges, of which he
4was found guilty.
We next consider whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying leave
to amend the complaint.   Leave to amend should be granted unless amendment is futile
or inequitable.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 106 (3d Cir. 2002). 
Because Shelley could describe a deprivation of liberty between his arrest and trial,
despite the dearth of facts about this time period in his complaint, the District Court
should have provided him leave to amend.  
The District Court also erred in dismissing Shelley’s false arrest claims.  At this
stage, it is unclear if the Heck doctrine will bar Shelley’s false arrest claims, whether the
underlying purportedly false arrest was for stalking, harassment, or making terroristic
threats.  A claim for false arrest does not necessarily implicate the validity of a conviction
or sentence.  See Gibson v. Superintendent of N.J., 411 F.3d 427, 449 (3d Cir. 2005);
Montgomery v. DiSimone, 159 F.3d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1998).  A district court must make a
fact-based inquiry to determine whether a successful § 1983 action would undermine the
validity of a conviction or sentence.  See Gibson, 411 F.3d at 451.  As we have noted, if
all reasonable inferences are taken in Shelley’s favor, Shelley was not convicted of
making terroristic threats.  Therefore, at this stage, it appears that there is no terroristic
threat conviction to put in question.  Shelley’s other false arrest claims tend to blur into
his claims that he was maliciously prosecuted (and is now imprisoned) for crimes he did
not commit.  However, the circumstances surrounding Shelley’s convictions for
     In his complaint, he included conflicting allegations about whether the purportedly2
false arrests were made by one or both of the troopers.  Taking all reasonable inferences
in his favor, he brought his claim for false arrest against Wilson and Brock.  
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harassment and stalking are not in the record.  Because the District Court could not
determine that a successful § 1983 action would implicate the validity of those
convictions on the present sparse record, the District Court erred in finding the false arrest
claims barred under Heck at this stage of the proceedings.  See Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d
1157, 1161 (11th Cir. 2003).   
Shelley otherwise stated a claim for false arrest.     The proper inquiry in a claim2
for false arrest under § 1983 is “not whether the person arrested in fact committed the
offense, but whether the arresting officers had probable cause to believe the person
arrested had committed the offense.”  See Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136,
141 (3d Cir. 1988).  Shelley alleged that he was arrested without probable cause.
Because Shelley stated claims for false arrest that we cannot say were barred, at
this stage, by the Heck doctrine, and because he should have been afforded leave to
amend his complaint, the District Court’s order is vacated in part to the extent it
dismissed the false arrest claims and denied leave to amend.  In all other respects, the
District Court’s order is affirmed.  Shelley’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied. 
This matter is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.  
